Journeys with Tim

I'd just like to point out that the question "Is there a motivation to do the good if you're not a theist" is kind of silly, given that even for theists God and their religion rarely play a role in their motivation for their ethical decisions. And since, when theistic considerations do play a role, they are completely arbitrary (since there's no reason to think that one religion has better access to the Word of God than any other, or that there even is a God), I think the better question is: "Can someone be a rational theist?" (Incidentally, I think there are rare cases where the answer is yes, but in general I would say no.)

Thanks for the comment, but I think you underestimate the theist position. Theism does provide motivation or moral action because theists think (a) that doing the good pleases God, and (b) they will be judged for their actions. The problem is for someone who doesn't think there will be consequences for their actions (except if they're caught).

Also, the theist need to take a view about which version of theism is correct, so the worry about which religion has better access to the Word of God doesn't arise i.e. someone can be a "minimal theist".

But is a moral agent acting morally if her primary source of motivation is to please another being or to get to Heaven (or not go to Hell)?

It seems like the best kind of (primary source of) motivation to (say) not murder someone would be (1) because the moral agent thought murdering to be wrong or (2) b/c she cared about the would-be-murdered person. Right?

Luka, you're right that motivation not to murder should include, (1) and (2), but the question is why be moral? Kant says it's because morally wrong actions are irrational.

I'm not sure I agree with Kant that all immoral actions are irrational, they might be for all I know. Of course if they are, then the atheist might have a reason to be good.

But the answer to the question (why be moral?) can just appeal to the motivations of the moral agent. So if the moral agent was motivated to not murder b/c she knows that murder is wrong (and she cares that it's wrong) or just that she cares about the would-be-murdered person enough not to murder them, then some combo of these motivations is why she's being moral. (Of course, this doesn't mean that everyone has these, or any, reasons to be moral.)

I don't agree with Kant that being immoral is being irrational. But even if it is, it's a type of irrationality that is so different from what I normally use that term to mean that it seems to be an unfortunate choice of words.

But the reason I originally commented here is because I thought you were saying, in your response to AshRyan, that one reason to be moral is to please God and another reason is fear of being judged as bad by God. And my point is that it seems like having these reasons to be moral bring the moral agent's moral status into question. These don't seem to be moral motivations.

We shouldn't be primarily motivated by the need to please another or through fear of being judged. If we are, then we're (at the very least) not as moral as those who do the right thing because it's the right thing, period. And we're not as good as those people who do the right thing because they care about the people they're helping (or whatever).

Don't you think?

Just ignore the first paragraph in my last comment. It's confused.

Yes. Doing the right thing simply to avoid punishment isn't as "good" as doing the right thing because it is good. Kant calls the first "acting in accordance with duty" and the second "acting for the sake of duty", and only the second counts as acting morally. So Kant would completely agree with your main point, and so do I.

I guess I was mainly responding to AshRyan who said "even for theists, God and their religion rarely play a role in their motivation for their ethical decisions." I think that's just false because some theists DO in fact act in a certain way in order to please God. You and I both agree that's not the best motivation for right action. In fact even some Christians agree and say you shouldn't be a Christian just for "fire insurance".

I was simply reporting how some Christians are in fact motivated, not trying to make a judgment about the best kind of motivation.

Fair enough. Relious people can be (and maybe often are) motivated by a fear of God or some desire to please Him. The non-religious obviously don't have this kind of motivation.

But I think that it deserves to be laid out there in a clear manner. It's not just that this kind of religious motivation is less good than the more purely moral kind of motivation mentioned above. It's that they are not morally good at all.

Do you agree with that?

The second-to-last sentence should read, "It's that it is not morally good at all."

Maybe. But perhaps doing an action to please someone or out of respect could count as a moral action. For exmample, a child who obeys a parent; an employee who obeys the direction of her/his boss. Or if my doctor tells me to get more exercise, don't I get some moral credit for following his orders even if the only reason I do so is because I fear getting sick.

The examples from above make it seem like it could be moral to place oneself "under the authority" of another and perform actions because one respects the office/expertise of another. That that seems similar to a Christians relationship to God. Why can't that count for something?

Yeah, those are tough examples for me to figure out the right thing to say about. I'm not sure that a child should get *moral* credit for doing what his parents say. Maybe he should. I just don't have a strong intuition about it. And I don't think that you should get moral credit for working out more. You should get some kind of credit (as should the child) but I'm not positive that it would moral credit.

But even if someone should get some moral credit for placing herself under the authority of another, I don't think that it should be much. Or, at least, let's put it this way. In the case where a person refrains from murdering only (or primarily) to please God (or to get into Heaven)that person is, at best, morally confused or, just as probably, morally degenerate.

That doesn't mean that all situations where you place yourself under the authority of another (or are primarily motivated by a concern for the status of your eternal soul) are like this. I'm not confident enough to generalize here. But the murder example seems pretty clear cut.